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This paper tests if Second Price Vickrey Auction (SPVA) and Discrete Choice Experiment 
(DCE) are isomorphic and whether lack of isomorphism is due to value-elicitation, value-
formation or both. We conduct an artefactual field experiment that combines induced-value 
(IV) and home-grown (HG) procedures using SPVA and DCE. IV preferences are elicited for 
tokens and HG preferences for multi-attribute lasagnes. Attributes are healthiness and 
environmental sustainability. Our results suggest that HG preferences differ across elicitation 
methods. This discrepancy is due to value-elicitation and value-formation. DCE is the most 
demand-revealing approach and provides the highest premiums for healthy and 





Food economists have a long-standing interest in consumers’ preferences for new 
products and food policies, such as food labelling. These preferences are needed either to 
gauge the demand for new products or to evaluate a food policy’s potential effectiveness 
before it is introduced. In both of these cases, market data are not yet available, and, hence, 
entrepreneurs and policy makers need robust techniques that can reliably elicit home-grown 
(HG) preferences for food. Home-grown preferences are those which are genuinely formed 
by people without any direct interference from researchers about the value of the good under 
study (Rutström, 1998). 
The techniques that are most commonly used to elicit HG preferences are discrete 
choice experiments (DCEs) (Thurstone, 1927) and experimental auctions (EAs). The second-
price Vickrey auction (SPVA) (Vickrey, 1961) is one of the most frequently applied EAs 
because it can be easily implemented in the lab as well as in the field, and laypeople appear to 
understand the mechanism better than they understand other EAs. Both DCEs and SPVAs are 
theoretically demand revealing, which means that under a correct monetary incentive scheme 
these techniques should induce subjects to truthfully reveal their real preferences (Cummings 
et al., 1997). Therefore, preferences elicited in DCEs and SPVA should be isomorphic. In 
other words, the HG preference order elicited should be invariant to the elicitation technique 
(Coppinger, Smith and Titus, 1980).  
Yet studies find that HG preferences for food items vary with the elicitation 
mechanism used (e.g., Lusk and Schroeder, 2006; Gracia, Loureiro and Nayga, 2011). There 
are two explanations for these empirical results. First, some elicitation mechanisms are not 
demand revealing in practice (value-elicitation problem). Second, there are differences in the 
way HG preferences are formed across elicitation mechanisms (value-formation problem) 
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(Lusk and Schroeder, 2006). Studies that only elicit HG preferences for food items cannot 
distinguish between these two explanations. 
Induced-value (IV) experiments provide a method that researchers can use to test if an 
elicitation mechanism is demand revealing in practice and, therefore IV experiments can 
detect value-elicitation problems (Vossler and McKee, 2006). In IV experiments, subjects are 
asked to express their willingness to pay (WTP) for fictitious goods (for example, tokens) 
whose values are given in the experiment. The induced value is the price the good can be 
exchanged for in the experiment (Smith, 1976).  
In this study, we test whether a lack of isomorphism across SPVAs and DCEs is due 
to value-elicitation problems by using an artefactual field experiment (Harrison and List, 
2004) that elicits both IV and HG preferences for private goods. We use a between-sample 
design and assign subjects to one of two treatment groups: SPVA or DCE. In each group, 
subjects complete both IV and HG elicitation tasks. The IV tasks measure demand revelation 
for a token, while the HG tasks elicit preferences for a real food item, a beef-based lasagne 
that is labelled using a traffic light system (TLS) for both environmental sustainability and 
healthiness. This study aims to identify the most demand-revealing elicitation approach 
between SPVA and DCEs, and, hence estimate unbiased preferences for healthy and 
environmentally sustainable beef lasagne. Additionally, we investigate whether value 
formation problems contribute to the lack of isomorphism across SPVAs and DCEs. 
Our results suggest that the HG preferences elicited in the SPVA and DCE tasks are 
not isomorphic. We show that differences in HG preferences are caused by both value-
elicitation and value-formation differences. The DCE elicits higher WTP estimates for our 
lasagnes than the SPVA. This result implies that using mechanisms that are not demand 
revealing can underestimate the premia that consumers are willing to pay for food products. 
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This study contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, this is the first 
study to explain the lack of isomorphism across elicitation mechanism by combining IV and 
HG procedures. Second, this is the first study to elicit consumers’ preferences for both 
healthy and environmentally sustainable products. Previous studies have elicited consumers’ 
preferences for either healthy or environmentally sustainable products, but have not 
combined both dimensions (e.g., Belcombe, Fraser and Di Falco, 2010; Caputo, Nayga and 
Scarpa 2013; Akaichi, Nayga and Nalley, 2017).  
 
2. The literature on demand-revelation 
2.1. Demand-revelation in the SPVA 
Although the SPVA have been regarded as theoretically demand-revealing, empirical 
results about demand revelation are mixed. Early IV investigations confirm demand 
revelation in SPVAs (e.g., Coppinger, Smith and Titus, 1980; Cox, Roberson and Smith, 
1982), however later studies consistently find that subjects tend to overbid (e.g., Kaegel, 
Harstad and Levin, 1987; Kaegel and Levine, 1993). Recent studies show that SPVA 
performs well at the aggregate level, but generates extreme behaviour at the individual level 
(e.g., Shogren et al., 2001; Noussair, Robin and Ruffieux, 2004; Lusk and Rousu, 2006). 
These studies find that subjects tend to underbid with respect to the dominant strategy.  
Horowitz (2006) proved that these mixed results occur because mechanisms are not 
always theoretically incentive compatible. Building on Karni and Safra’s (1987) work on the 
incentive compatibility of the Becker deGroot Marschak (BDM) (Becker, DeGroot and 
Marschak, 1964) mechanism in which lotteries are at stake, he proved that BDM and SPVA 
are not incentive compatible when subjects bid according to some forms of non-standard 
expected utility theory. To date, no empirical study has tested whether the SPVA fails to be 
demand revealing because of the Horowitz theory or because details of the experimental 
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design lead subjects to fail to identify the optimal strategy for example due to the low cost of 
deviations from the optimal strategy. 
 
2.2. Demand-revelation in the DCE 
The theoretical incentive compatibility of hypothetical DCE responses about public 
goods is a controversial topic that has received much attention in the stated-preference 
literature (see discussions in Cummings et al., 1997; Harrison, 2006; Carson and Groves, 
2007). In a private good context, DCEs should replicate the results of revealed preference 
analyses, if individuals face the real consequences of their choices (i.e., a transaction takes 
place), only one choice situation determines real consequences, and they fully understand 
instructions. 
Two IV studies test demand revelation in DCEs. Collins and Vossler (2009) use 
referenda-style DCEs to elicit IV preferences for public goods and services, and Luchini and 
Watson (2014) elicit IV preferences for a private good. These studies provide mixed results. 
Collins and Vossler (2009) find a high level of demand revelation and Luchini and Watson 
(2014) a moderate level. However, the cognitive demands of the DCE tasks differ across the 
studies: Collins and Vossler (2009) elicit preferences for three attribute bundles in which 
each attribute is numerical using six choice sets, whereas Luchini and Watson (2014) elicit 
preferences for four attribute bundles in which three attributes are categorical using nine 
choice sets.  
 
2.3. Isomorphism in home-grown preferences 
Although SPVA and DCE mechanisms should be isomorphic, many studies 
investigating HG preferences for food products have shown that they are not. Lusk and 
Schroeder (2006) found that SPVA bids were significantly lower than WTP estimated from 
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DCE when eliciting students’ HG preferences for steaks. Other studies have found that 
valuation differences across mechanisms are correlated with individual’s characteristics. 
Gracia, Loureiro, and Nayga (2011) found that differences between random nth auction bids 
and DCE WTP estimates depend on individuals’ socio-demographic characteristics. Grebitus, 
Lusk and Nayga (2013) found that discrepancies between HG preferences for apple and wine 
products elicited using SPVA and DCE are related to subjects’ personality traits.  
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Case study 
The food that we purchase and eat not only affects our health, but also the 
environment. Diets with high quantities of meat are environmentally unsustainable because 
livestock production is associated with the high levels of greenhouse gas emission (GHGE) 
(e.g., Carlsson-Kanyama and González, 2009). In the UK, many people consume large 
quantities of meat and they do not associate meat with GHGEs (Macdiarmid, Douglas and 
Campbell, 2016). This study tests a labelling approach to encourage consumers to reduce 
their meat intake. 
In the UK, consumers are informed about the nutritional properties of products that 
are sold in the market via food labels. An example is the Traffic Light System (TLS) 
developed by the Food Standard Agency (FSA, 2013). The TLS labels typically indicate the 
levels for four key nutrients: fat, saturated fat, sugar and salt. These levels are mapped using a 
chromatic scale: red for high content, amber for medium content, and green for low content 
(FSA, 2013). On the other hand, consumers have little guidance about the negative 
externalities that food production has on the environment. In our study, we develop a new 
TLS related to carbon footprint where: red stands for high, amber for medium, and green for 
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low carbon footprint.2 We then use the new TLS alongside the traditional nutritional 
information TLS to investigate the extent to which consumers trade-off health and 
environmental sustainability. 
Our study focus on preferences for a specific beef-based food: frozen lasagne. The 
healthiness and environmental sustainability of this food item can be manipulated by 
changing the proportions of the traditional ingredients (e.g. beef, pasta, sauce, cheese). We 
use the saturated fat content of the food (saturated fat g/100g product) as the indicator for the 
healthiness and the greenhouse gas emissions (GHGE) (kgCO2e/100g product) as an 
indicator for the environmental sustainability.3 We maintain a similar appearance and same 
portion size (400 grams) across the dishes to minimise selection bias based on the visual 
appeal of the food.   
There are nine lasagne options; three levels of healthiness by three levels of GHGE. 
The healthiness is varied by manipulating the saturated fat content of the lasagne. We used 
different grades of scotch beef (i.e. fatty/lean), different cheese types (i.e. full fat/reduced fat) 
and the amount of fat added in the cooking process. The GHGE is varied by using different 
quantities of beef, cheese and vegetables. The lasagne recipes were designed and prepared at 
the Human Nutrition Unit (HNU) at The Rowett Institute (University of Aberdeen, United 
Kingdom). The lasagne were pre-cooked and frozen at the HNU then transported frozen 
(using cooling bags) to the location of the experiment (SEEL, University of Aberdeen) on the 
day of the experiments. Subjects were provided with plastic cooling bags to keep any 
lasagnes they took home frozen.  
 
                                                            
2 Carbon footprint represents the greenhouse gas emissions associated with production of a product (Carbon 
Trust, 2012). 
3 We used the FSA TLS to determine the quantity of saturated fat. Only saturated fat is considered since high 




3.2. Sample and experiment procedures  
Our sample consists of 128 consumers randomly recruited from the population living 
in or around the city of Aberdeen. The study was advertised as a generic study on consumers’ 
food choices about beef-based products.  
The sample for the main study was randomly split across two treatment groups, one for 
each alternative elicitation mechanism: 63 subjects were allocated to SPVA treatment and 65 
to the DCE treatment.4,5 An in-depth description of each elicitation mechanism is provided in 
Appendix 1.6 
All subjects receive a show-up fee of £10 (given to them at the end of the experiment) 
and perform the following tasks in order: a) complete the IV task after having received 
instructions on the procedure; b) complete the HG task after having received instructions on 
the procedure; and finally c) answer a series of debriefing questions about their consumption 
habits and socio-economic status. Subjects were not informed about the outcome of the IV 
tasks until the end of the experiment to prevent their earnings in the IV tasks influencing their 
purchasing behaviour in the HG task. The IV and HG tasks are described in the following 
section and summarized in Table 1.7 
 
 
                                                            
4 In the SPVA treatment, we ran 8 sessions: four sessions with 8 subjects, two sessions with 9 subjects, one 
session with 7 subjects and the remaining session with 6 subjects. In the DCE session, we implemented 5 
sessions with 10, 9, 18, 9, and 19 subjects, respectively. All DCE sessions and 4 SPVA sessions were run 
between 28th January 2015 and 24th April 2015. Additional 4 SPVA sessions were run in September 2017. All 
sessions took place either at 1.30pm or 5.30 pm. This is to avoid any potential confounding effect related to 
time, hunger and satiety. 
5 Subjects were assigned to treatment groups using the following randomization procedure, each subject has a 
chance p=0.32 (31 subjects out of 96) to be assigned to the SPVA treatment group and a chance q=0.68 (65 
subjects out of 96) to be assigned to the DCE treatment group. We acknowledge that our randomization 
procedure may be biased because of the additional sampling campaign conducted to run the additional 4 
sessions in September 2017. 
6 All appendixes that are mentioned in the paper are available electronically. 
7 No practice sessions were run for the IV and HG tasks because the length of experimental instructions and 
tasks was substantial. However, subjects were extensively instructed about elicitation mechanisms and detailed 
examples of different choice-behaviour in each treatment were provided. Subjects were also invited to ask 




Table 1. Steps of Elicitation Procedures 
a.  Induced-value Tasks 
Step SPVA DCE 
A Subjects receive a bidding sheet for 9 numbered 
tokens, each associated with a resale value 
Subjects are presented with 9 choice sets (2 tokens 
and an opt-out) 
B Subjects bid for each token on the bid sheet 
 
Subject choose the most preferred alternative in 
each choice set 
C The binding token is randomly drawn 
 
The binding choice set is randomly drawn  
D The winner is identified as the subject who 
submitted the highest bid 
The profit is calculated and paid. Profit = induce 
value - market price for buyers. Profit = 0 for the 
others 
E The market price is identified as the second highest 
bid 
  
F The profit is calculated and paid. Profit = induce 
value - market price for winners. Profit = 0 for the 
others 
  
b. Home-grown Tasks 
Step SPVA DCE 
A Subjects receive a bidding sheet with 9 lasagnes  Subjects are presented with 9 choice sets (2 
lasagnes and an opt-out) 
B Subjects bid for each lasagne on the bid sheet 
 
Subject choose the most preferred alternative in 
each choice set 
C The binding lasagne is randomly drawn 
 
The binding choice set is randomly drawn  
D The winner is identified as the subject who 
submitted the highest bid 
Subjects who buy the lasagne, pay the market price 
and get the lasagne, while the others do not 
E The market price is identified as the second highest 
bid 
 
F The winner pays the market price and gets the 





3.3. Second-Price Vickrey Auction 
In the IV task, subjects are asked to bid on nine tokens numbered from 1 to 9. Induced 
values for the tokens range from £1.00 to £5.00 in £0.50 increments.8 Each subject faces each 
induced value only once and, hence, the whole induced demand curve is induced during the 
game. Subjects are told that the induced value is the price at which they sell tokens back to 
                                                            
8 As standard in SPVA, subjects were informed that the distribution of IV prices differed across subjects. 
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the researcher, if they win and buy the token. We call this the resale value of the token. 
Subjects’ earnings depend on their own and others’ bids for the one randomly selected token, 
the binding token, which is unknown to the subjects prior to bidding. The winner is identified 
as the subject who submitted the highest bid for the binding token, while the market price at 
which the winner buys the binding token is identified as the second highest bid.9 Our 
experimental instructions follow those provided by Shogren et al. (2001).  
In the HG task, subjects are asked to bid on each of the nine different lasagnes.10,11   
Subjects may win and buy one lasagne, the binding lasagne.12 Whether or not a subject wins 
depends on the subject’s own and others’ bids. As above, the winner is identified as the 
subject who submitted the highest bid for the binding lasagne, while the market price at 
which the winner buys the binding lasagne is identified as the second highest bid. This 
procedure follows that reported in Lusk and Schroeder (2006) and Gracia, Loureiro and 
Nayga (2011).  
 
3.4. Discrete Choice Experiment 
In the IV task, we mimic a typical DCE and create choice sets that each contain two 
tokens and an opt-out (i.e. buy neither alternative). Tokens have two attributes: market price 
and resale value (or induced value). The market price is the price at which subject buys the 
token, the resale value is the price at which they will sell the token. The IV and market prices 
                                                            
9 The winner can incur a loss. In that case, the loss is subtracted from the show-up fee. Subjects are informed 
about this. 
10 The sequence of lasagne from right to left are randomized. Half of the subjects were presented with lasagnes 
ordered from red-red to green-green, while the other half of the subjects were presented with an inverted order 
of lasagne (i.e, from green-green to red-red).  
11 In our instructions, we provide two sequences of bidding examples. Half of them subjects were presented with 
a sequence in which higher bids were associated with healthy and low carbon footprint lasagne. The other half 
was presented with a sequence in which higher bids were associated with unhealthy and high carbon footprint 
lasagne.   
12 To avoid food waste, the binding lasagne was randomly drawn before the experiment was conducted and only 
portions of the binding lasagne were cooked and carried to the experimental lab. The draw was video-recorded 
and showed to subjects at the end of the sessions. 
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range from £1.00 to £5.00 in £0.50 increments. An IV and a market price are allocated to 
each token using a fractional factorial design (ChoiceMetrics, 2012). In each choice set, 
subjects are asked to select their most preferred alternative.13 Each subject’s profit is the 
difference between the induced value and the market price of the chosen alternative in the 
binding choice set, which is randomly selected (see footnote 7 for subject who incur in 
losses).  
The design of our IV DCE is based on previous studies (Collins and Vossler, 2009; 
Luchini and Watson, 2014). We focus on a comparison of our study to Luchini and Watson’s 
application (2014), which also elicits IVs for private goods. Luchini and Watson (2014) 
describe tokens using 4 attributes, each presenting three categorical levels. Colour can be red, 
blue, or yellow; shape can be circular, squared or triangular; and size can be small, medium, 
large. Each of these categorical levels is associated to a marginal IV, so that subjects are 
required to compute the total IV of each token presented in the choice sets by adding 
marginal IVs. The last attribute is price. The design of our IV task is simpler because we 
directly present the total IV of each alternative token to subjects, instead of asking subjects to 
compute this from marginal level-based IVs. Our approach is conceptually equivalent to 
Luchini and Watson’s design and resembles the classic design of IV SPVA studies, where 
subjects are typically provided with the total IV associated to each fictitious good and not 
asked to compute it. Our instructions replicate those reported in Collins and Vossler (2009) 
and Watson and Luchini (2014).  
In the HG task, we design a DCE to elicit subjects’ preferences for a lasagne described 
by three attributes: healthiness, carbon footprint, and market price. The healthiness and 
carbon footprint attributes each have three levels low, medium and high, and are described 
using a TLS with the colours green, amber and red, respectively. The market price ranges 
                                                            
13 Choice tasks have been randomized across respondents to control for order effect. 
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from £1.00 to £5.00 in £0.50 increments. We generate our nine choice sets by using a D-
efficient design (ChoiceMetrics, 2012)14,15. Each choice task has three alternatives: two 
lasagne portions and an opt-out (i.e. buy nothing). At the end of the experiment, each subject 
pays the market price of the chosen lasagne (if any) in the binding choice set and gets the 
lasagne. Subjects who selected the opt-out, pay nothing and get nothing.16 Our instructions 
follow those reported in Lusk and Schroeder (2006) and Gracia, Loureiro and Nayga (2011).  
 
4. Testing isomorphism using HG procedures 
4.1. Testable hypotheses and model specifications 
We test the consistency in HG preferences across the SPVA and DCEs (i.e., 
isomorphism) using a two-step procedure (Lusk and Schroeder, 2006; Gracia, Loureiro, and 
Nayga, 2011). First, models for panel data are estimated using SPVA data and Random 
Utility Models (RUMs) (McFadden 1973) are estimated using DCE data. Second, we 
estimate the marginal WTP (mWTP) for the healthiness and carbon footprint of lasagne and 
compare these across the elicitation mechanisms using the Poe, Giraud and Loomis’ 
convolution approach (2005).17 
We analyse the SPVA data using generalised least-square regression models with 
correction for heteroscedasticity following Akaichi, Nayga and Nalley (2017) (Model 1a) 
(Equation 1)18:  
 
                                                            
14 Priors estimated from the pilot study were used here. A small pilot for the SPVA with 10 subjects as well as 
10 individual DCE-based interviews were conducted in January 2015. Subjects participating to the pilot were 
consumers and monetary incentives were not used in the pilot sessions. 
15 Choice tasks have been randomized to control for a potential order effect. 
16 To avoid food waste, the binding choice set was randomly drawn before the experiment. This draw was video 
recorded and the video was presented to subjects at the end of the experiment. 
17 Summary statistics of variable used to detect possible differences in sample composition across treatment 
groups are available in Appendix 4. 
18 As suggested by an anonymous referee, we test normality, homoscedasticity and correlation of the errors. 




𝐵𝐼𝐷_𝐻𝐺 , =  𝛼 +  𝛽  𝐻𝐸𝐴_𝐴 , +  𝛽  𝐻𝐸𝐴_𝐺 , +  𝛽  𝐶𝐹_𝐴 , +
 𝛽  𝐶𝐹_𝐺 , + 𝛾𝑋 + 𝜀 ,                                                                                  (1) 
 
The dependant variable (BID_HGi,q) indicates the difference between individual i’s bids 
for each lasagne and individual i’s bid for the lasagne that is labelled as red in both 
healthiness and carbon footprint.19 The dependent variable ranges from £-4 to £5. Our 
subjects are informed that the price of lasagne in the market ranges from £1 to £5. Our 
modelling approach does not control for observed bids being censored by the market prices, 
there are several reasons why we don’t do this. First, the observed bids are not right censored 
at £5 because lasagne available in the market are not perfect substitutes of our experimental 
lasagne (see Harrison et al., 2004). Lasagne alternatives that are sold in Scottish retail stores 
do not show carbon footprint labels. Therefore, our subjects may be willing to bid more than 
£5 for a low carbon footprint lasagne. Second, observed bids are not left censored at £1 
because our subjects can bid less than £1 to get a lasagne at a lower than market price. We 
find no evidence of bids being concentrated around the signalled prices, which suggests that 
the market price information did not affect subjects’ bidding behaviour (see Figure 1 
Appendix 3).20 We estimate models that account for censoring to check the robustness of our 
results. Details are provided in Appendix 3.  
The coefficient βHEA_A, denotes the average mWTP for an improvement in healthiness 
from red to amber, coefficient βHEA_G, denotes the average mWTP for an improvement in 
healthiness from red to green, coefficient βCF_A, denotes the average mWTP for an 
improvement in carbon footprint from red to amber, variable coefficient βCF_G denotes the 
                                                            
19 Following Gracia, Loureiro and Nayga (2011), we have q ={1,…,8}. 
20 We expected any potential effect to be rather negligible because pre-cooked frozen lasagne is a very popular 
ready meal in the UK and therefore we did not tell our subjects something that they were not aware of. For 
example, the 43% of our sample eat this product at least 1 or 2 times a month, and 54% has eaten at least a 
lasagne in the last 3-4 weeks. 
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average mWTP for an improvement in carbon footprint from red to green. The term α is the 
slope and εi,t is our error term. 
A vector of interaction terms (X) between main variables and a set of socio-economic 
variable is incorporated in the modelling to control for differences in sample composition. 
These socio-economic variables were detected estimating a binary logit model where the 
dependent variable is whether each subject i belongs to the SPVA treatment group or not.21 
These socio-economic variables are: i) the variable FREQ, which indicates the number of 
times that a subject consumes lasagnes per month and is interacted with preferences for 
healthiness (HEA_A, HEA_G) and carbon footprint (CF_A and CF_G); ii) the variable 
TASTE_HEA, which indicates subjects’ perceived tastiness of lasagne that are red compared 
to those that are green in healthiness (on a scale from 1 and 7). This variable is interacted 
with preferences for healthiness (HEA_A, HEA_G); iii) the variable TASTE_CF, which 
indicates the subjects’ perceived tastiness of lasagne that are red compared to those that are 
green in in carbon footprint (on a scale from 1 and 7). This variable is interacted with 
preferences for carbon footprint (CF_A and CF_G); iv) the variable UNEMPL, which 
indicates unemployment and is interacted with HEA_A, HEA_G, CF_A and CF_G.22  
A random-parameters logit model in willingness-to-pay space is estimated using data 
collected from the DCE (Model 2a) (Train, 2009). The utility function of Model 2a is 
specified as follows (Equation 2a): 
 
𝑉 , , = 𝛽 + 𝛽 _ 𝐻𝐸𝐴_𝐴 , , + 𝛽 _ 𝐻𝐸𝐴_𝐺 , , + 𝛽 _ 𝐶𝐹_𝐴 , , +
                                                            
21 Results on differences in sample composition are available in Appendix 4. We acknowledge that there may be 
differences between subsamples that we were not able to control for. 
22 Another potential confounding could be the appearance of lasagne, even though lasagne look very similar. We 
asked subjects who participated to the extra 4 sessions in September 2017 whether they believed the lasagnes to 
look the same or not. Only one third of the subsample believe that the lasagne look different. We also run an 
additional model controlling for this effect and results suggest that appearance does not affect preferences (see 
Appendix 7).  
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𝛽 _ 𝐶𝐹_𝐺 , , + 𝛽 , 𝑃𝑅 , , + 𝛾𝑋                                            (2a) 
 
In Equation 2a, βj is a coefficient indicating subjects’ preferences for the opt-out 
alternative with respect to the lasagne alternatives.23 The coefficients βHEA_A,i and βHEA_G,i 
indicates subjects’ mWTP for lasagnes that are amber and green in healthiness (HEA_A and 
HEA_G, respectively) compared to lasagnes that are red in healthiness (HEA_R). The 
coefficients βCF_A,i and βCF_G,i indicate subjects’ mWTP for lasagnes that are amber and green 
in carbon footprint (CF_A and CF_G, respectively) compared to lasagnes that are red in 
carbon footprint (CF_R). The coefficients βHEA_A ,βHEA_G, βCF_A  and βCF_G are all assumed to 
be normally distributed with means and standard deviations to be estimated. The coefficient 
βpr indicates subjects’ preferences for the price of lasagnes (PR) and is modelled as a random 
parameter following a log-normal distribution with mean and standard deviation to be 
estimated.24 We also incorporate a set of interaction terms (X) between lasagne attributes and 
socio-economic variables that control for differences in sample composition across 
treatments. This is equivalent to set of interaction terms (X) for the SPVA data in Equation 1, 
except for the interaction terms incorporating the variable UNEMPL. In Equation 2a, the 
variable UNEMPL is directly interacted with the lasagne price, PR.25 
Assuming that the vector of coefficients θ associated to our random parameter is 
distributed according to the distribution f(θ), the probability P of choosing an alternative j is 
described in Equation 2b: 
 
𝑃 , , = ∫
, ,
∑ , ,
𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃                        (2b) 
                                                            
23 Lasagne alternatives are normalized to 0 to guarantee identification. 
24 The WTP-space model requires a specific modelling of utility parameters. Details are not provided here to 
keep the paper of a manageable length, but can be found in Train and Weeks (2005). 
25 We acknowledge that we do not estimate interaction between the main effect of the lasagne attributes and this 




The probabilities described in Equation 2b are numerically approximated by using 
methods of maximum simulated likelihood relying on 1,000 Halton draws (Train, 2009). 
We acknowledge that other possible modelling approaches are available, for example 
the estimation of random parameter models in preference space. Therefore, to check the 
robustness of our results, we also estimated: i) a random parameter multinomial logit model 
where the price coefficient is assumed to be log-normally distributed and all other attributes 
are fixed; and ii) a random parameter multinomial logit model with coefficients related to 
healthiness and carbon footprint of lasagnes are assumed to be normally distributed. These 
models are reported in Appendix 5. In the paper, we focus on the WTP space estimation 
because it allows us to directly estimate mWTP for the lasagne attributes (Scarpa, Thiene and 
Train, 2008). This makes SPVA and DCE data analyses strictly comparable.  
We test whether SPVA and DCE are isomorphic by comparing mWTPL for healthiness 
and carbon footprint estimated from the DCE and SPVA treatments where L ={HEA_A, 
HEA_G, CF_A, CF_G}. We use the Poe, Giraud and Loomis’ (2005) convolution approach. 
We use parametric bootstrapping techniques (i.e., Krinsky and Robb, 1986), to generate 1,000 
bootstrapped values for each mWTPL’s distribution and calculate 1,000,000 differences 
between the two bootstrapped distributions. We test the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1 
H0:  mWTPL,SPVA = mWTPL,DCE  
H1:  mWTPL,SPVA ≠ mWTPL,DCE,  
 






Table 2 reports the results of the generalised least-square regression models with 
correction for heteroscedasticity of SPVA bids (Model 1a).26 We find that the mWTP for an 
improvement in healthiness from red to amber is £0.738 (βHEA_A, p<0.01), and from red to 
green is £1.188 (βHEA_G, p<0.01). The mWTP for an improvement carbon footprint from red 
to amber is £0.693 (βCF_A, p<0.05), and from red to green is £1.126 (βCF_G, p<0.01).27,28 
  
                                                            
26 Tables providing main statistics of all variables used in our models are presented in Appendix 6. 
27 In Appendix 6, we also provide: i) results from censored and uncensored random effects models; ii) results 
from all models estimated without controlling for differences in treatment groups; iii) results from Hausman 
Test (1978) and Breush Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test. 
28 Appendix 7 provides results on the “appearance” and “instruction” effects. 
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Table 2. Generalised least-square regression models with correction 
for heteroscedasticity for SPVA Dataa 
 Model 1a  Model 1a 
Dep.Var.: BID_HG Dep.Var.: BID_HG 
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
α -0.271*** βHEA_A_TASTE -0.136*** 
 (0.0975)  (0.0221) 
βHEA_A 0.738*** βHEA_G_TASTE -0.303*** 
 (0.115)  (0.0221) 
βHEA_G  1.188*** βCF_A_TASTE 0.0885 
 (0.115)  (0.0583) 
βCF_A 0.693*** βCF_G_TASTE 0.0569 
 (0.114)  (0.0583) 
βCF_G 1.126*** βHEA_A_UNEMPL -0.0486 
 (0.114)  (0.121) 
βHEA_A_FREQ 0.0147 βHEA_G_UNEMPL 0.0127 
 (0.0978)  (0.121) 
βHEA_G_FREQ -0.0572 βCF_A_UNEMPL -0.218* 
 (0.0978)  (0.121) 
βCF_A_FREQ -0.109 βCF_G_UNEMPL -0.450*** 
 (0.0998)  (0.121) 
βCF_G_FREQ -0.260*** Log-likelihood -635.456 
 (0.0998) Observations 504 
  Subjects 63 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 




Table 3 reports the results of the Random Parameter Logit model estimated in WTP 
space using DCE choice-data (Model 2a).29 We find that the mWTP for an improvement in 
healthiness from red to amber is £0.509 (mWTPHEA_A) and mWTP for an improvement in 
healthiness from red to green is £1.022 (mWTPHEA_G). Regarding carbon footprint, the mWTP 
for an improvement from red to green is £1.560 (mWTPCF_G), while subjects are not willing 
to pay a premium for an improvement from red to amber in the carbon footprint dimension 
(mWTPCF_A = £0.05, not statistically different from £0).  
 
                                                            
29 Appendix 8 provides: i) results from random parameters logit model estimated in preference space; ii) results 




Table 3. Random Parameter Logit model estimated in WTP space using DCE 
choice-dataa,b,c 
 Model 2a  Model 2a 
Dep.Var.: CHOICE_HG Dep.Var.: CHOICE_HG 
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
βOPT_OUT 0.780*** βHEA_A, MEAN, FREQ -0.425*** 
 (0.223)  (0.148) 
βPRICE, MEAN -0.247 βHEA_G, MEAN, FREQ 0.342*** 
 (0.0928)  (0.0966) 
βHEA_A, MEAN 0.509*** βCF_A, MEAN, FREQ -0.125 
 (0.124)  (0.0991) 
βHEA_G, MEAN 1.022*** βCF_A, MEAN, FREQ 0.148 
 (0.126)  (0.117) 
βCF_A, MEAN 0.0563 βHEA_A, MEAN, TASTE 0.116*** 
 (0.149)  (0.0414) 
βCF_A, MEAN 1.560*** βHEA_G, MEAN, TASTE -0.0615** 
 (0.170)  (0.0293) 
βPRICE, SD 1.924*** βCF_A, MEAN, TASTE 0.171** 
 (0.426)  (0.0669) 
βHEA_A, SD 1.171*** βCF_G, MEAN, TASTE -0.138** 
 (0.162)  (0.0652) 
βHEA_G, SD 0.705*** βPRICE, MEAN, UNEMPL -0.136** 
 (0.093)  (0.0543) 
βCF_A, SD 0.288***   
 (0.097) Log Likelihood -380.567 
βCF_G, SD 1.033*** Observations 1,755 
 (0.117) Subjects 65 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
a Standard Errors in parentheses 
b Allowing correlation 
c In Model 2a, PRICE is a random parameter assumed to be lognormally distributed, and   




Mean and confidence intervals of the mWTPL’s empirical distributions and the 
results of Poe, Giraud and Loomis’ test are reported in Table 4. We find that SPVAs and 
DCEs are not isomorphic. In fact, we find that the premium subjects are willing to pay for 
lasagnes that are green in healthiness, amber in healthiness and green in carbon footprint are 
statistically different in the SPVA and DCE (p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively). These 




Table 4. Comparisons of Marginal Willingness to Pay (in £) across 
Treatmentsa 
 Model 1a Model 2a P-value 
mWTPHEA_A 0.738*** 1.013*** 0.160 
 (0.446, 0.929) (0.447; 1.442)  
mWTPHEA_G 1.184*** 2.041*** 0.001 
 (0.907; 1.379) (1.343; 2.466)  
mWTPCF_A 0.696*** 0.102 0.033 
 (0.392;0.888) (-0.624; 0.600)  
mWTPCF_G 1.129*** 3.124*** 0.000 
 (0.852; 1.315) (2.135; 3.684)  
  Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
 a Confidence interval (5%; 95%) is reported in parentheses  
 
 
5. Testing value elicitation problems using IV procedures 
5.1. Testable hypotheses and model specifications 
Using data from our IV tasks, we test whether the lack of isomorphism in HG 
preferences is a value-elicitation problem. In a SPVA, the response strategy that maximizes 
subjects’ payoff is to bid an amount of money equal to the resale value associated with the 
token t. Therefore, SPVA is demand revealing if the bids (BID_IVi,t) are equal to resale 
values (IVi,t). In the DCE, subjects face a choice k between two tokens and doing nothing. 
Each token has a pay-off, which is the difference between the price and the resale value of the 
token. A DCE is demand revealing if observed choices (CH_IVi,k) are equal to choices that 
maximizes subjects’ payoff, hereafter expected choices (EXP_CH_IVi,k).  
We investigate demand revelation at both the aggregate and individual level. At 
aggregate level, in the SPVA treatment, we calculate the percentage of bids in which the 
subjects maximize their payoff (i.e., demand revealing bids). In the DCE tasks, we measure 
the percentage of payoff maximising choices (i.e., demand revealing choices). The degree of 
difficulty of the two elicitation mechanisms may differ. We allow for this by defining the 
degree of demand revelation in the SPVA treatment group in two ways: i) the SPVA is 
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demand revealing with no error margin, if the submitted bid for a token is equal to the resale 
value associated to that token; and ii) the SPVA is demand revealing with ± £0.50 margin 
error, if the submitted bid for a token is £0.50 greater or smaller than the resale value 
associated to that token. This approach follows that of Shogren et al. (2001) and is consistent 
with our IVs which were randomly drawn from a uniform distribution of [£1.00, £5.00] in 
£0.50 increments. 
To analyse demand revelation at the individual level, we estimate two econometric 
models. Model 3a is estimated using SPVA data, and Model 4a DCE data. Model 3a (i.e., 
SPVA) is estimated using a two-way random-effects procedure. A Tobit model is not 
appropriate because data are not censored. In fact, subjects were not forced to submit positive 
bids in the SPVA treatment (see experimental instructions in the supplementary appendix). 
Model 3a takes the same form of Equation 3. 
 
𝐵𝐼𝐷_𝐼𝑉 , = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝐼𝑉 , + 𝜑 + 𝜇 + 𝜀 ,    (3) 
 
The dependant variable (BID_IVi,t) is individual i’s bids for each token t = {1,..,T} and  
ranges from £0 to £7. Our variable IVi,t denotes subject i’s induced value for token t, α is the 
intercept, the term μi represents subject-specific characteristics, the terms φt are introduced as 
dummies in the models and represent token-specific effects such as learning or fatigue trends 
in bidding behaviour30 and εi,t is our error term with mean zero and variance σε. These models 
are estimated under the assumptions that μi and φt are drawn from a bivariate normal 
distribution.31  
                                                            
30 Only T-1 terms are estimated as token 1 is used as baseline to guarantee identification.  
31 The modelling approach used for data collected in the SPVA treatment replicates that used by Shogren et al. 
(2001) and Parkurst, Shogren and Dickinson (2004).  
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The SPVA is demand revealing if we fail to reject the null joint hypothesis that the 
estimated parameter α is equal to zero, the coefficient associated to the IV variable (β) is 
equal to 1, and the vector of coefficients denoting token-specific effects (φt) are equal to zero 
in Model 3a (as in Shogren et al., 2001). In fact, if these conditions are met Equation 3 
reduces to BID_IVi,t = IVi,t. Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested here using standard 
post estimation procedures (i.e., Wald Test). 
 
Hypothesis 2 
H0:  α = 0, β = 1 and φt = 0  
H1:  α ≠ 0,β ≠ 1 and φt ≠ 0 
 
Model 4a (DCE) is modelled using Random Utility Models (RUMs). The utility that 
subject i attaches to each alternative j in each choice set k is decomposed into two parts, Vi,j,k, 
the part of the utility observed by the researcher, and εi,j,t, which cannot be observed by the 
researcher, so that, Ui,j,k = Vi,j,k+ εi,j,k. In our application, we assume that εi,j,k are i.i.d. extreme 
value and therefore we estimate a Multinomial Logit Model. In both models, the utility 
function is specified as follows (Equation 4): 
 
𝑉 , , = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑉 , , + 𝛽 𝑃𝑅 , ,      (4) 
 
In Equation 4, βj is a coefficient indicating subjects’ preferences for the token 
alternatives with respect to the opt-out.32 The coefficients βIV and βPR inform us on 
preferences for the selling (IVi,j,k) and buying price (PRi,j,k), respectively. Variables IVi,j,k and 
                                                            
32 Only J-1 terms are estimated because the alternative specific constant associated to the opt-out alternative is 
dropped to guarantee identification. 
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PRi,j,k indicate induced-value and buying prices of each alternative j presented in our choice 
sets.  
The estimation of multinomial logit is problematic, if a large majority of subjects 
always choose the dominant option (in our case the payoff maximising option).33 However, 
we do not find evidence of this: 66.5 percent of choices are for the payoff maximising option 
and only 38.5 percent of participants always select the payoff maximising option. 
Nevertheless, we explore alternative modelling approaches that mitigate this issue: i) error 
component logit model; ii) scale heterogeneity multinomial model (Fiebig et al., 2009); and 
iii) generalized multinomial logit model (Fiebig et al., 2009) or scaled mixed logit model 
(Greene and Hensher, 2010).  
We assume that a choice-based elicitation mechanism is demand revealing if we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients βIV and the negative of βPR are equal 
to each other. Therefore, the following hypotheses are tested: 
 
Hypothesis 3 
H0:  βIV  = -βPR  
H1:  βIV  ≠ -βPR 
 
5.2. Results 
At the aggregate level, we find that 31.92% of bids in the SPVA are equal to the IVs, 
and, hence, strictly demand revealing. When we allow for ±£0.50 error margin, this 
percentage rises to 52.57%. We find most subjects underbid (60.01%) and this is in line with 
previous findings by Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux (2004), Shogren et al. (2001) and Lusk 
and Rousu (2006). In our DCE treatment, the percentage of demand revealing (payoff 
                                                            
33 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.  
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maximizing) choices is 65.58%, which is similar to the results reported in Luchini and 
Watson (2014).  
Table 5 reports the results of the two-way random-effects models that test demand 
revelation in the SPVA treatment (Model 3a). We find that the coefficient α  and most of the 
terms φt are not statistically different from 0, while the coefficient β is equal to 0.859 
(p<0.01).  In a Wald Test we reject the null hypothesis that α = 0, β = 1 and φt=0 (Hypotheses 
2) (p<0.05), and, hence, we conclude that SPVA is not demand revealing.34 We find that 
















                                                            
34 Results from One-way and Two-way Fixed Effects models using data collected in the SPVA treatment are 
reported in Appendix 10 along with those from the Hausman Test (1978) and the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
Multiplier tests. These testing procedures show that Random-Effects Models are superior to Fixed-Effects and 
Ordinary Least Square models. 
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Table 5. Random-Effects Models for the SPVA 
Treatmenta,b 
 Model 3a  
Dep .Var.: BID_IV  
Variable Coefficient  
α 0.0849  
 (0.112)  
β 0.859***  
 (0.0227)  
φTOK2 -0.0485  
 (0.125)  
φTOK3 -0.140  
 (0.125)  
φTOK4 -0.390***  
 (0.125)  
φTOK5 -0.271**  
 (0.125)  
φTOK6 -0.340***  
 (0.125)  
φTOK7 -0.163  
 (0.125)  
φTOK8 0.0427  
 (0.125)  
φTOK9 -0.0392  
 (0.125)  
σu 0.979  
σε, 0.758  
ρ 0.664  
H0:α=0 & β=1 & φTOKt=0  38.86***  
R-squared 0.478  
Observations 567  
Subjects 63  
Note: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
a Robust standard errors in parentheses - clustering 












Table 6 reports the results from all the choice models estimated to test demand 
revelation in DCE treatment: i) multinomial logit models (Model 4a); ii) error component 
logit model (Model 4b); ii) scale heterogeneity multinomial model (Model 4c); and iii) 
generalized multinomial logit model or scaled mixed logit model (Model 4d). Using a Wald 
Test, we fail to reject the null hypothesis βIV  = - βPR (Hypothesis 3) in all estimated model 
specifications and we conclude that the DCE is demand revealing.  
At the individual level we find that the DCE is the most demand revealing preference 
elicitation technique. We conclude that DCE is more demand revealing than SPVA, and 
therefore, the lack of isomorphism found is a value-elicitation problem.  
 
Table 6. Models for DCE Treatmenta,b,c 
 Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c Model 4d 
Dependent Variable  CH_IV CH_IV CH_IV CH_IV 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
βIV 3.489*** 3.905*** 3.760*** 3.905*** 
 (0.286) (0.266) (0.729) (0.747) 
βPR -3.489*** -3.871*** -3.731*** -3.871*** 
 (0.242) (0.245) (0.669) (0.687) 
βOPT-OUT, MEAN -0.251 -0.276 -0.198 -0.276 
 (-0.294) (0.284) (0.283) (0.292) 
βOPT-OUT, ST.DEV. - 1.002*** - 1.002*** 
 (-) (0.209) (-) (0.323) 
τ - - 0.0587* -0.000984 
 (-) (-) (0.0328) (0.00432) 
H0:ΒIV = -βPR 0.000 0.200 0.130 0.180 
Log likelihood  -295.651 -277.356 -283.356 -277.350 
Observations 1,755 1,755 1,755 1,755 
Number of id  65 65 65 65 
Note: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
a Standard errors in parentheses 
b Model 4a is multinomial logit model 
  Model 4b is an error component model 
  Model 4b is scale heterogeneity multinomial logit 
  Model 4c is a generalized multinomial logit model 







6. Testing value-formation by combining IV and HG procedures 
6.1. Testable hypotheses and model specifications 
In this section, we use a novel method to test whether lack of isomorphism between 
mWTP estimates for lasagne attributes elicited using a SPVA add DCE is entirely a value-
elicitation problem. We test if HG preferences are equal across the SPVA and DCE when 
only subjects who provide demand revealing bids and choices in the IV tasks are included in 
the analysis. Demand revealing bids and choices are those maximizing subjects’ payoffs in 
the IV SPVA and DCE tasks, respectively. If only those subjects, who submit demand 
revealing bids and choices, are included in the statistical analysis, then any differences we 
find in mWTPs are not due to a value-elicitation problem and instead indicate a value 
formation problem.  
We test this hypothesis using the same two-step procedure, modelling approaches 
and estimation procedures implemented to test isomorphism. First, we analyse the SPVA data 
using generalised least-square regression models with correction for heteroscedasticity 
(Model 5a) and the DCE data using a random parameters logit model estimated in WTP 
space (Model 6a). Then, we compare mWTPL,DR - the mWTP for the lasagne attributes 
estimated only for ‘demand revealing’ respondents - across the SPVA and DCE. We use the 
Poe, Giraud and Loomis’ (2005) convolution approach to test the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4 
H0:  WTPL,SPVA,DR = WTPL,DCE,DR 
H1:  WTPL, SPVA,DR ≠ WTPL,DCE,DR 
 





In the SPVA, 14 (out of 63) subjects submitted only demand revealing bids in the IV 
tasks. In the DCE, 25 (out of 65) subjects always made demand revealing choices in the IV 
tasks.35  Table 7 presents results for the SPVA (Model 5a), while Table 8 presents the results 
from the DCE (Model 6a). 36,37,38 Table 9 presents a comparison of mWTPs that are estimated 
for lasagne attributes using SPVA and DCE data and suggests that mWTPL,DR for some 
lasagne attributes differ across treatment groups (Hypotheses 4). We find differences in 
mWTP for a lasagne that is amber in healthiness (p<0.01), amber in carbon footprint 
(p<0.05) and green in carbon footprint (p<0.01) between SPVA and DCE treatment groups. 
These results suggest that lack of isomorphism detected in our experiment is not 
solely due to a value elicitation problem in the SPVA. In this analysis all respondents were 
able to make demand revealing bid in the IV SPVA or choices in IV DCE. This implies that 
our finding of differences in mWTP for lasagne attributes across the SPVA and DCE may 
also be due to value-formation problem. These results are robust across model specifications 
as shown in Appendix 15.39 However, we acknowledge that caution is needed when 
interpreting these results because sample sizes in our treatment are now very small. Further 
research with a larger sample size is needed.    
                                                            
35 Results on distributions of subjects making demand revealing bids or choices are presented in Appendix 11. 
Interestingly, there are no subjects submitting 7 or 8 demand revealing bids or choices (out of 9), indicating that 
our sample of subjects in both treatments make either demand revealing or non-demand revealing bids/choices 
consistently. 
36 Appendix 12 shows that normality and homoscedasticity are not supported, while autocorrelation is not an 
issue (Table 6). 
37 Appendix 13 provides: i) results from estimation of random effects censored and uncensored models; iii) 
results from the estimation of all models without control for differences in subsample composition; iii) results 
from the estimation of models assuming the ±0.5 error margin. 
38 Appendix 14 provides: provides: i) results from random parameters logit model estimated in preference space; 
ii) results from estimation of a multinomial logit estimated in WTP and preference space. 
39 Appendix 15 also presents comparisons of mWTPs across treatment groups when we take into account a 




Table 7. Generalised least-square regression models with correction 
for heteroscedasticity for SPVA Dataa 
 Model 5a  Model 5a 
Dep.Var.: BID_HG Dep.Var.: BID_HG 
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
α -0.051 βHEA_A_TASTE -0.270*** 
 (0.184)  (0.0644) 
βHEA_A -0.857** βHEA_G_TASTE -0.522*** 
 (0.432)  (0.0644) 
βHEA_G  1.281*** βCF_A_TASTE -0.168 
 (0.432)  (0.126) 
βF_A 0.351 βCF_G_TASTE -0.244* 
 (0.298)  (0.126) 
βCF_A 0.473 βHEA_A_UNEMPL 1.457*** 
 (0.298)  (0.309) 
βHEA_A_FREQ 0.389 βHEA_G_UNEMPL 0.263 
 (0.252)  (0.309) 
βHEA_G_FREQ -0.542** βCF_A_UNEMPL 0.0204 
 (0.252)  (0.237) 
βCF_A_FREQ -0.237 βCF_G_UNEMPL -0.222 
 (0.254)  (0.237) 
βCF_G_FREQ -0.174 Log-likelihood -96.711 
 (0.254) Observations 112 
  Subjects 14 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 







Table 8. Random parameter multinomial logit model in WTP space for DCE 
Dataa,b,c 
 Model 6a  Model 6a 
Dep.Var.: CHOICE_HG Dep.Var.: CHOICE_HG 
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
βOPT_OUT 3.968*** βHEA_A, MEAN, FREQ -0.300 
 (0.721)  (0.293) 
βPRICE, MEAN -0.877 βHEA_G, MEAN, FREQ 1.118*** 
 (0.952)  (0.312) 
βHEA_A, MEAN 0.429* βCF_A, MEAN, FREQ 0.212 
 (0.256)  (0.273) 
βHEA_G, MEAN 0.663*** βCF_A, MEAN, FREQ -0.187 
 (0.247)  (0.294) 
βCF_A, MEAN 0.877** βHEA_A, MEAN, TASTE -0.209 
 (0.351)  (0.151) 
βCF_A, MEAN 2.130*** βHEA_G, MEAN, TASTE -0.0608 
 (0.476)  (0.128) 
βPRICE, SD 2.460*** βCF_A, MEAN, TASTE -0.0224 
 (0.713)  (0.127) 
βHEA_A, SD -1.575*** βCF_A, MEAN, TASTE 0.104 
 (0.244)  (0.193) 
βHEA_G, SD 2.334*** βPRICE, MEAN, UNEMPL 0.542*** 
 (0.441)  (0.205) 
βCF_A, SD -0.0302   
 (0.0958) Log Likelihood -138.879 
βCF_A, SD 1.875*** Observations 675 
 (0.367) Subjects 25 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
a Standard Errors in parentheses 
b Allowing correlation 
c In Model 2a, PRICE is a random parameter assumed to be lognormally distributed, and   






Table 9. Comparisons of Marginal Willingness to Pay (in £) across 
Treatmentsa 
 Model 6a Model 6a P-value 
mWTPHEA_A, DR -.870** 0.872 0.005 
 (-2.031; -0.169) (-0.522; 1.760)  
mWTPHEA_G, DR 1.294*** 1.289*** 0.495 
 (0.169; 2.011) (0.139; 2.082)  
mWTPCF_A, DR 0.340 1.742*** 0.030 
 (-0.465; 0.817) (-0.057; 2.292)  
mWTPCF_G,DR 0.467 4.294*** 0.000 
 (-0.396; 0.950) (1.732; 5.924)  
  Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 




Previous experiments eliciting HG preferences for food products have shown that 
auction- and choice-based approaches are not isomorphic, meaning that the use of different 
elicitation mechanisms leads to different WTP estimates for the same good. An open question 
remains whether this is because these elicitation mechanisms differ in their degree of demand 
revelation and/or because HG preferences are formed differently across elicitation 
mechanisms.  
This paper is the first study to answer this question using an innovative experimental 
design that combines IV and HG procedures for a SPVA and DCE. We elicit IV preferences 
for a fictitious good (token) and HG preferences for real food product (beef-based lasagne) 
that varies in healthiness and carbon footprint. Our study design allows us to test 
isomorphism and determine whether this phenomenon is a value-elicitation problem. In 
addition, it allows also testing for a value-formation problem while controlling for value 
elicitation differences.   
We find that HG preferences elicited using SPVAs and DCEs are not isomorphic. After 
controlling for potential differences in sample composition, our results suggest that HG 
preference patterns variy depending on the elicitation mechanism. Our investigation of IV 
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preferences shows that the DCE is the most demand revealing preference-elicitation 
procedure. Taken together, our results imply that that lack of isomorphism in our empirical 
application is caused by a value-elicitation problem in the SPVA, but this result does not rule 
out value-formation problems in the HG task as well. 
We investigate value formation-issues by comparing the HG preferences and mWTPs of 
subjects submitting only demand revealing bids or making only demand revealing choices in 
the IV tasks of our SPVA and DCE treatments, respectively. We find that estimated mWTPs 
varies across mechanisms, and hence, we conclude that the lack of isomorphism in our HG 
preferences is also due to a value formation problem.  
Our results suggest three areas in which future research is needed. First, in this study 
the number of subjects, who consistently submit optimal bids and choices, is small and this 
may affect the reliability of our findings. Future research with a larger sample size is needed. 
Second, future research could test whether value-elicitation issues occur because SPVA is not 
demand revealing for some non-expected utility maximizer subjects, as suggested by 
Horowitz (2006), or because the experimental designs induce subjects to fail to identify the 
optimal bidding strategy (i.e. random mistakes). Third, we find that HG preferences are 
constructed differently across mechanisms and future research could test if the value-
formation processes are more valid in one mechanism or the other.40 
Our experiment is also informative about consumers’ preferences for health- and 
environmental-related food traits. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to 
investigate consumers’ trade-offs between healthy and environmentally sustainable versions 
of food products. As our IV analysis suggests that DCE provides more accurate preferences, 
we focus on results from the estimation of our random-parameter logit model in WTP space. 
These results suggest that consumers prefer green to red lasagnes in both dimensions, while 
                                                            
40 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this comment. 
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they only prefer amber to red lasagne when it comes to healthiness. Consumers value 
substantial reductions (i.e., green) in carbon footprint more than reduction in healthiness, 
while the opposite is true for moderate reductions (i.e., amber). These results are based on a 
small sample (i.e., 65 consumers) that cannot be representative of the Scottish population. 
Therefore, new research involving bigger sample is needed to draw more conclusive findings. 
Results also suggest that SPVA underestimates the premiums subjects are truly willing to pay 
for healthier and more environmental sustainable lasagnes.  
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